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ABSTRACT
In a public good environment with positively correlated types, we characterize optimal
mechanisms when agents have private information and can enter collusive agreements.
First, we prove a weak-collusion-proof principle according to which there is no restriction
for the principal in oering weak-collusion-proof mechanisms. Second, with this principle,
we characterize the set of allocations which satisfy individual and coalitional incentive
constraints. The optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanism calls for distortions away
from rst-best eciency obtained without collusion. Allowing collusion restores continuity
between the correlated and the uncorrelated environments. When the correlation becomes
almost perfect, rst-best eciency is approached. Finally, the optimal collusion-proof
mechanism is strongly ratiable.
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1 Introduction
The provision of public goods under informational constraints is one of the leading text-
book examples of public economics. How should a society made of several agents with
heterogeneous tastes for a public good design an incentive mechanism to induce truthful
revelation of the agents' valuations? Does eciency conict with incentives? How can
this conict, if any, be solved? Finally, what is the distribution of informational rents
induced by asymmetric information?
One striking feature of most previous works on these issues is that they deal mainly
with the case where agents are unable to form coalitions to collectively manipulate the
decision rule.
1
By focusing on the role of individual incentive constraints, an important
dimension of resource allocation in society has been neglected: the formation of groups.
It is particularly troublesome when these coalitions can signicantly reduce the eciency
of the optimal mechanism designed in the absence of coalition incentive constraints. As
Olson (1965, p. 1) has forcefully emphasized groups of individuals with common interests
usually attempt to further those common interests [  ] and are expected to act on behalf
of their common interests much as single individuals are often expected to act on behalf
of their personal interest." Following this argument, the standard theoretical framework
must be amended to allow also for the formation of groups promoting their own collective
goals instead of that of society as a whole. The present paper oers a framework in which
the consequences of collusion under asymmetric information on both allocative eciency
and the distribution of rents in society can be assessed.
We model a conict between a social welfare maximizer and a group of agents who
benet from the public good but who do not care about its budgetary cost. Contrary
to the standard assumption in mechanism design, the planner has not a perfect control
of the communication technology so that he cannot prevent the agents from colluding.
2
Collusion between these agents is modeled in reduced form as in Laont and Martimort
(1997). A third-party proposes to the colluding agents a side-mechanism to collectively
manipulate their sending of messages to the government. As suggested above, this third-
party does not internalize the social cost of the project but maximizes only the sum
of the agents' utilities. Lastly, no technology for a credible disclosure of information is
available to the colluding partners. The mere forming of a coalition does not change
1
Groves (1973) and Green and Laont (1977) showed that eciency could be achieved under asym-
metric information on the agents' valuations with dominant strategy if budget balance is not a concern.
Arrow (1979) and Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) showed that budget balance could be achieved
under Bayesian implementation. Laont and Maskin (1982) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) showed
that adding the possibility for the agents to veto the mechanism introduces a real conict between ef-
ciency and incentives leading to the underprovision of the public good. Ledyard and Palfrey (1996)
show that this conict also arises in the absence of participation constraints when incentives conict with
redistribution concerns.
2
See Palfrey (1992) for a discussion of this assumption and some of its implications in the case of
Bayesian implementation.
2
informational asymmetries between the agents. Coalition formation takes place under
asymmetric information.
When agents do not collude, their Bayesian-Nash behavior does not put any constraint
on the set of interim individually rational and incentive compatible allocations in a cor-
related information environment. Indeed, as shown by Crémer and McLean (1988) in the
case of auction mechanisms, the existence of even a small amount of correlation between
the agents' valuations for the public good is enough to allow the principal to elicit this
almost common" information. This result is in sharp contrast with the case of uncorre-
lated information since then eciency does conict with incentives. Hence, the optimal
levels of public good exhibit discontinuities when the degree of correlation goes to zero.
This costless extraction of the agents' surplus by the principal suggests also that
they are likely to form an active coalition in such a correlated information environment.
Nevertheless, a weak collusion-proofness principle holds in this context: any equilibrium of
the overall game of contract oer cum coalition formation achieves an outcome which can
be replicated with a weakly collusion-proof grand-mechanism, i.e., a grand-mechanism
such that the null side-contract is a continuation equilibrium of the game of coalition
formation. Since one agent's acceptance of the side-contract depends on the status quo
utility level that he gets from playing non-cooperatively the grand-mechanism oered
by the principal, the issue of learning from disagreement arises. Weakly collusion-proof
mechanisms are such that the null side-mechanism is a continuation equilibrium of the
game of coalition formation sustained with passive beliefs.
3
The weak collusion-proofness principle provides a tractable description of the set of
perfect Bayesian equilibria of the overall game of contract oer cum coalition formation.
After having described this set, the principal's welfare is optimized subject to participa-
tion, individual and coalition incentive constraints. Generally, the ecient levels of public
good can no longer be costlessly implemented even in a correlated environment. Taking
into account coalition incentive constraints, there exists now a trade-o between eciency
and rent extraction. Distortions in the quantities of public good which are produced in
the dierent states of nature reduce the cost of the binding coalition incentive constraints.
Depending on the degree of correlation, collusion-proofness constraints take quite dif-
ferent forms. For weak positive correlation, collusion-proofness constraints are similar to
those that would arise under symmetric information within the coalition. When the degree
of correlation diminishes, coalition incentive constraints are then less and less binding and
the principal prevents more easily collusion. In the limit of uncorrelated information, the
principal costlessly obtains collusion-proofness and the contractual outcome is the same
as if agents had not been colluding. By adding coalition incentive constraints, one moves
then continuously from the outcome with a strictly positive correlation to the outcome
3
Rubinstein (1985) coined this expression for games with asymmetric information in which equilibrium
behavior is sustained with prior beliefs out of the equilibrium path.
3
with no correlation.
4
For strong correlation, collusion-proofness constraints under asymmetric information
are instead quite dierent from those obtained when agents can credibly disclose their in-
formation. When the correlation becomes almost perfect, there is only a small probability
that agents have dierent valuations for the public good. The principal can shut-down
production in this state of nature at almost no social cost. This breaks the coalition
agreement and almost achieves the rst-best level of expected welfare.
Since it is implemented with Bayesian strategies, the optimal weakly collusion-proof
contract is sensitive to the exact beliefs that the agents have at the time of playing this
mechanism. Because we focus on the case where valuations for the public good may take
only two values, the equilibrium correspondence of this optimal mechanism as posterior
beliefs change can be fully described. This step of the analysis allows us to discuss
the robustness of the optimal mechanism to a preplay communication stage in which
agents may veto or ratify the truthful play of this mechanism and thereby signal some
information to each other. It is then possible to show that the optimal weakly collusion-
proof mechanism is strongly ratiable in the sense of Cramton and Palfrey (1995).
Collusion in public good mechanisms has been rst analyzed by Green and Laont
(1979) who prove that the Groves mechanisms are not robust to coalitions when agents
share freely their information. Still with dominant strategy mechanisms but with a con-
tinuum of types, Laont and Maskin (1980) show then that only pooling decision rules
can be implemented. Crémer (1996) takes into account asymmetric information within
coalitions and shows that the Groves mechanisms are not robust to size-two coalitions
but not beyond. Similarly, there exist some relatively negative results in the case of Nash
implementation when agents can form coalitions (Maskin (1979)). The Nash environment
can be seen as an extreme case of perfect correlation between the agents' types. Our
focus on Bayesian implementation with two types brings more positive results.
5
Under
asymmetric information within the coalition, the principal can implement a much larger
set of allocations in these strongly correlated environments. More generally, our approach
provides a complete description of the set of implementable allocations under collusion.
This paper extends Laont and Martimort (1997) by stressing the role of correlated
information between the agents as a determinant of the strength of their coalition and by
making no restriction on the set of available mechanisms. In this previous work, we re-
stricted the analysis to the case of anonymous mechanisms and uncorrelated information.
6
With no correlation, there always exists a costless weakly collusion-proof implementation
4
Interestingly, this result requires neither risk-aversion of the agents' utility functions nor limited
liability constraints on transfers (Robert (1991)).
5
See also Laont and Maskin (1979).
6
Beside the dierences in the informational structures and the set of available mechanisms, this pre-
vious paper was dealing with a model of regulation. This latter dierence is without consequence on the
results.
4
of the second-best non-cooperative outcome if the principal can oer non-anonymous
Bayesian mechanisms. However, collusion still matters when types are correlated even
without any exogenous restriction on the set of mechanisms. Moreover, working in a
correlated environment, we obtain a full characterization of all transfers in the optimal
weakly collusion-proof mechanism. This characterization allows to compute all the ex
post rents precisely and to characterize the outcome of the grand-mechanism when beliefs
dier from passive ones. This is an important step towards checking the strong ratiability
of the mechanism.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses the optimal mechanism when agents
do not collude. Section 4 derives the weak collusion-proofness principle and characterizes
weakly collusion-proof allocations. Section 5 describes the optimal weakly collusion-proof
mechanism. Section 6 discusses strong ratiability. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Technology, Preferences and Information
We consider the provision of public good in a partial equilibrium model. A positive
amount x of public good can be produced at cost c() with c
0
() > 0 and c
00
() > 0. There
are two agents in the economy denoted by A
i
; i 2 f1; 2g.
7
Each of them derives utility
U
i
= 
i
x   t
i
from consuming an amount x of public good and paying tax t
i
. Agent A
i
agrees to participate in the public good mechanism when his participation constraint is
satised.
The agents' valuations for the public good, 
i
; i 2 f1; 2g, are drawn from a common
knowledge joint distribution on 
2
where  = f;

g is the common support of 
1
and

2
( =

   ). We refer to the probabilities p(
i
; 
j
) of each state (
i
; 
j
), for (i; j) 2
f1; 2g
2
; as the common knowledge prior beliefs. To make notation simpler, we also write:
p(

;

) = p
11
; p(;

) = p(

; ) = p
12
; p(; ) = p
22
; where the equality p(;

) = p(

; )
is derived from the symmetry between the two agents. Finally, to capture the congruence
of the agents' interests, 
1
and 
2
are positively correlated and
p
12
p
11

p
22
p
12
: We denote by
 = p
11
p
22
  p
2
12
the degree of positive correlation ( = 0 for independent types). For
simplifying technicalities, we also assume that p
12
 p
11
.
8
The conditional beliefs of agent
A
i
on A
j
's type (j 6= i) induced by the joint distribution above are the same for both
agents and, slightly abusing notations, are denoted by p.
The government, or principal P , only knows the distribution of the agents' valuations
7
Restricting to two agents avoids to consider the formation of subcoalitions and signicantly simplies
notations. However, our methodology could be extended to more than two agents at the cost of an
increase in complexity.
8
This assumption ensures that the optimal collusion-proof mechanism under asymmetric information
never entails bunching in the case of small correlation. It simplies signicantly the exposition.
5
for the public good but is uninformed on the exact realizations of these shocks at the
time of choosing the public good mechanism. His objective is to maximize the sum of the
agents' utilities knowing that the decit for the production of the public good must be
covered by distortionary taxation raised elsewhere in the economy. Formally, the social
welfare function is written as SW =
P
2
i=1
U
i
  (1 + )

c(x)  
P
2
i=1
t
i

; where  is the
exogenous cost of public funds.
9
2.2 Mechanisms
The principal proposes a grand-mechanismG to the agents. G maps any pair of messages
(m
1
;m
2
) belonging to the product message space M
1
M
2
= M (where M
i
denotes the
message space used by agent A
i
) into a triplet fx; t
1
; t
2
g. x denotes the amount of public
good produced (x 2 X = IR
+
) and t
i
(i 2 f1; 2g) is the tax paid by agent A
i
to the
principal. We denote by G = fx(); t
1
(); t
2
()g this grand-mechanism.
10
To make notation simpler in the case of direct mechanisms (M =  ), we denote
by x; x^ and x respectively the levels of public good when both agents claim

, when their
claims dier (

; ) and when they both claim . We also denote by t
kl
for k; l 2 f1; 2g
the tax paid by an agent whose type is 
i
=  + (2   k) when the other agent's type
is 
j
=  + (2   l). Because of symmetry between the agents, the corresponding taxes
are independent of the agents' identity.
11
2.3 Coalition Formation
An uninformed third-party, T , proposes a side-mechanism S = f(); y
i
()
i2f1;2g
g to the
agents to induce their collusive behavior.
 () is a collective manipulation of the messages sent to the principal.
 fy
i
()g
i2f1;2g
is a pair of side-transfers. The third-party is not a source of money and
therefore the coalition's budget is balanced:
P
2
i=1
y
i
(
1
; 
2
) = 0 for all (
1
; 
2
) 2 
2
.
From the revelation principle, there is no loss of generality in assuming that S is a
9
The model is formally equivalent to the Laont and Tirole (1986) partial equilibrium model of
regulation. It could be possible to build a general equilibrium model endogenizing the value of . This
could be done by introducing a third uninformed agent, say A
3
, in the analysis. By imposing that the
sum of the contributions made by this agent and the group A
1
 A
2
covers exactly the cost of the public
good as in Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1978), we would be able to endogenize the value of the budget
constraint's multiplier. Moreover, because of complete information on A
3
's valuation for the public good,
this agent could be forced to always pay his valuation for the public good. One would then be interested
by the coalition between A
1
and A
2
against A
3
.
10
Note that we do not restrict a priori the set of mechanisms available to the set of direct mechanisms.
Other message spaces than the product of the agents' type spaces 
2
can be used by the principal.
11
The symmetry of the grand-mechanism is without loss of generality under a non-cooperative behavior
as we will see below. We also show in the Appendix that it is without loss of generality in the case of
collusion for a small correlation. The amount of public good does not need to depend on the identity of
who has a high valuation for the public good when claims dier.
6
direct mechanism.
12
Therefore () and y
k
() (k 2 f1; 2g) map 
2
respectively into the
set of measures on M and the set of balanced side-transfers.
Lastly, T is benevolent and maximizes the sum U
1
+ U
2
of the two colluding agents'
utilities obtained by playing the composition of the grand- and the side-mechanism.
13
2.4 Timing of the Game
The timing of the overall game of contract oer cum coalition formation is as follows (see
also Figure 1 for the game tree):
1. Agents learn their respective valuations for the public good.
2. P proposes a grand-mechanism G. If an agent vetoes the grand-mechanism, all
agents get their reservation utility normalized exogenously at zero.
3. The third-party proposes a side-mechanism S to the agents and a non-cooperative
continuation play of G if anyone refuses this side-contract. If both agents accept
S, agents report their types to the third-party who recommends reports into the
grand-mechanism and who commits to enforce the corresponding side-transfers.
4. Reports are sent into the grand-mechanism. The decision on the size of the public
good is made and taxes are paid by the agents. Side-transfers, if any, are imple-
mented.
The third party's oer of a side-mechanismS on top of the grand-mechanismG induces
a two stage game
^
 (G;S): In the rst ratication stage, agents simultaneously accept or
refuse the side-mechanism and may thereby signal their types to each other. In the second
communication stage, agents send messages either directly to the principal if at least one
of them has refused the side-mechanism or to the third-party if both have accepted. The
third-party recommends then a collective manipulation of the messages to be sent to the
principal. We denote by
^
E(G;S) the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria of
^
 (G;S).
We are interested in nding the optimal mechanismG, knowing that the continuation
game of coalition formation consists rst of a side-mechanism S optimally chosen by the
third-party and second of a ratication-communication game
^
 (G;S).
12
For any grand-mechanism oered by the principal, one can restrict the third-party to use direct
side-mechanisms at the nal stage of the game of contract oer cum coalition formation.
13
Using this third-party as a side-contract mechanism designer avoids the dicult issue of informa-
tional leakages through contract oers. It eliminates also the problem of nding an extensive form for
describing the collusive game between the agents. This third-party paradigm can be seen as a black-box
for the repeated interaction by which collusion emerges. This is a modeling short-cut to justify also our
assumption that the side-contract is in fact enforceable even if there is no court of justice available to do
so. This modeling characterizes the highest bound that can be achieved by the coalition.
7
Note rst that we eliminate equilibria based on weakly dominated strategies at stage
3 of the overall game. Indeed, for any grand-mechanism G, there always exists a con-
tinuation equilibrium of the game of coalition formation in which each agent refuses any
collusive oer he may receive because he expects that the other agent also refuses this
oer anyway. Second, following A
i
's rejection, A
j
(j 6= i) may have updated his beliefs on
A
i
's type. These beliefs aect the non-cooperative play of the grand-mechanism G and
therefore the status quo payos that A
i
gets following a rejection of the side-mechanism
S. Therefore, there may exist several side-mechanisms oered as continuation equilibria
of the game of coalition formation depending on what is learnt following the rejection of
these side-mechanisms.
Let f~p
1
; ~p
2
g be a belief system where ~p
i
are agent A
 i
's beliefs on agent A
i
if A
 i
con-
templates A
i
's refusal to play the side-mechanism S. We denote by  (G; ~p
i
; p
 i
) the game
of asymmetric information induced by the grand-mechanism G at stage 4 following A
i
's
refusal of playing S. In particular  (G; p; p) denotes this game of asymmetric information
when it is played with passive prior beliefs. E(G; ~p
i
; p
 i
) denotes the set of Bayesian-Nash
equilibria of  (G; ~p
i
; p
 i
). Finally, let us denote by U
i
(
i
; e
i
) the payo of a 
i
agent A
i
in
an equilibrium e
i
2 E(G; ~p
i
; p
 i
). Note that this interim payo is computed as an expec-
tation with respect to prior beliefs. Indeed, because joint deviations have probability zero
in a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, nothing has been learned on A
 i
following A
i
's refusal.
Therefore, the deviant agent A
i
still continues to play the grand-mechanism with his prior
beliefs on A
 i
's type.
We are interested in collusive continuation equilibria in which no learning occurs from
the agreement of playing the side-mechanismS. We can thus dene similarly  (GS; p; p)
the game of asymmetric information induced by the composition of the grand-mechanism
G and the side-mechanism S at stage 4 following acceptance of playing S by both agents.
E(G S; p; p) denotes similarly the set of Bayesian-Nash equilibria of  (G S; p; p). Since
the revelation principle applies at the last stage of the game, there is no loss of generality
in considering that E(G  S; p; p) contains the truthful equilibrium e

. Let U
i
(
i
) denote
agent A
i
's payo in this equilibrium when his type is 
i
.
3 No-Collusion and the First-Best Outcome
It is by now a well known result that the optimal mechanism achieves the rst-best out-
come in this correlated environment when the implementation concept is Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium, even with interim individual rationality constraints (Crémer and McLean
(1988)).
14
The key is to use agent A
2
's report, which is truthful in equilibrium, as a signal
correlated with agent A
1
's type and to condition A
1
's taxes on this information. The
14
See also McAfee and Reny (1991) in the case of a continuum of types and Riordan and Sappington
(1988) for a related model using ex post information in the case of only one agent.
8
exibility in the taxes paid in the dierent states of nature can then be used to stochas-
tically and costlessly deter any incentive to lie. If agent A
1
does not report truthfully
his type, the mechanism is designed so that he gets a negative expected payo. Since this
ingenious trick can be used for each agent simultaneously, the revelation of both agents'
types obtains at no cost for the principal.
Obviously, the taxes paid by the agents may be quite large when types become almost
uncorrelated.
15
Indeed, the conditional probability that agents have the same types di-
minishes and the punishments (or rewards) in the dierent states of nature must increase
to induce revelation.
We provide thereafter a simple proof of this rst best implementation in our public
good setting. To do that, we rst need to describe the set of implementable allocations in
this non-cooperative context. Without collusion, the revelation principle yields a charac-
terization of the set of implementable allocations with individual incentive compatibility
constraints only. Consider the Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint of agent A
1
when he has a high valuation

 for the public good.
16
Multiplying it by p(

) = p
11
+p
12
> 0,
this constraint writes as:
p
11
( t
11
+

x) + p
12
( t
12
+

x^)  p
11
( t
21
+

x^) + p
12
( t
22
+

x); (1)
Similarly, when A
1
has a low valuation  for the public good, his Bayesian incentive
compatibility constraint writes as (again multiplying by p() = p
12
+ p
22
> 0):
p
12
( t
21
+ x^) + p
22
( t
22
+ x)  p
12
( t
11
+ x) + p
22
( t
12
+ x^); (2)
Moreover, A
1
must be induced to participate to the mechanism without knowing A
2
's
type. The following interim participation constraints must also be satised: For a

 agent
p
11
( t
11
+

x) + p
12
( t
12
+

x^)  0; (3)
and for a  agent
p
12
( t
21
+ x^) + p
22
( t
22
+ x)  0: (4)
The principal maximizes expected welfare dened as:
SW = p
11

2

x 2t
11
+(1+)(2t
11
 c(x))

+2p
12

(

+)x^ t
12
 t
21
+(1+)(t
12
+t
21
 c(x^))

+p
22

2x  2t
22
+ (1 + )(2t
22
  c(x))

subject to constraints (1) to (4).
17
Proposition 1 : Assume that types are strictly positively correlated,  > 0, then the
optimal provision of public good without collusive behavior entails:
 The rst-best decision rule (x

; x^

; x

) where c
0
(x

) = 2

, c
0
(x^

) = +

 and c
0
(x

) = 2.
 Participation constraints (3) and (4) are binding and both agent's types get zero rent.
15
See the Appendix for explicit formulas of these taxes.
16
By symmetry A
2
faces the same incentive and participation constraints.
9
Proof: All proofs are in an Appendix.
To implement the rst-best outcome, the participation constraints (3) and (4) must be
binding and we look for solutions such that the incentive constraints (1) and (2) are also
binding.
18
Then the existence of some strictly positive correlation imposes that the system
of linear binding constraints (1)-to-(4) is in fact invertible. This invertibility ensures that
the rst-best schedule of public goods can be implemented at zero cost for the principal
The taxes which implement this optimal allocation of public good are highly dependent
on the information structure. When correlation becomes weaker, taxes become increas-
ingly punishing when both agents claim

 and when the agent who pays the tax claims
 and the other claims

. On the contrary, agent A
i
is increasingly rewarded when both
agents claim being  and when he claims

 and A
j
(j 6= i) claims . Indeed, with positive
correlation, it becomes easier to induce revelation from a

 agent A
i
if, when he lies, he
is heavily punished when facing a

 agent A
j
(j 6= i) who truthfully reveals.
Even a very small amount of correlation can be used to threaten the agents of being
heavily punished for lying on their types and to achieve the rst best allocation. However,
with no correlation, allocative distortions become necessary to reduce a

 agent's costly
informational rent. Therefore, in this non-cooperative setting, the optimal mechanism
fails to be continuous with respect to the information structure.
For notational convenience, let p^ denote the probability of a high valuation type in
the case of no correlation. We have thus p
11
= p^
2
, p
22
= (1  p^)
2
and p
12
= p
21
= p^(1  p^).
Proposition 2 : Assume that types are independently distributed,  = 0, then the optimal
provision of public good without collusive behavior entails:
 The second-best decision rule (x

0
; x^

0
; x

0
) where c
0
(x

0
) = 2

, c
0
(x^

0
) =  +

  

1+
p^
1 p^

and c
0
(x

0
) = 2   2

1+
p^
1 p^
:
 A

 (resp. ) agent gets a strictly positive (resp. zero) rent.
Without any correlation, the system of binding equations (1) to (4) can no more be
inverted. Only expected taxes are dened from the binding incentive (1) and participation
constraints (4) and a

 agent's informational rent becomes costly. Allocative distortions
of x^ and x are needed to reduce this cost.
4 Collusion
Because the agents get zero rent from the mechanism proposed by the principal if they
play non-cooperatively, they are willing to coordinate their messages to countervail the
principal's power. The optimal grand-mechanism with a non-cooperative behavior creates
endogenously the stakes for some collusive behavior.
18
Crémer and McLean (1988) show in fact that incentive constraints can be slack.
10
4.1 The Third-Party's Problem
Following Cramton and Palfrey (1995), we say that a side-mechanism S is unanimously
ratied for (e
1
; e
2
; ~p
1
; ~p
2
) if, for all 
i
2  and all i,
U
i
(
i
)  U
i
(
i
; e
i
)
where e
i
2 E(G; ~p
i
; p
 i
) is a non-cooperative equilibrium of  (G; ~p
i
; p
 i
) and where
U
i
(
i
) =
X

 i
p(
 i
j
i
)

y
i
(
i
; 
 i
)  t
i
((
i
; 
 i
)) + 
i
x((
i
; 
 i
))

;8
i
2 ;
is a 
i
agent A
i
's payo from playing e

2  (G  S; p; p).
Denition 1 : A continuation collusive equilibrium of the game of coalition formation
consists of rst, a system of beliefs f~p
1
; ~p
2
g and associated equilibria e
i
2  (G; ~p
i
; p
 i
)
(i 2 f1; 2g) and second, a truthtelling direct side-mechanism S

which is unanimously
ratied for the quadruplet (e
1
; e
2
; ~p
1
; ~p
2
) and which maximizes the third party's objective
function.
The continuation equilibrium of the game of coalition formation is thus a solution to
the third-party's following problem (denoted thereafter (T )):
max
f();y
k
()
(k2f1;2g)
g
X
(i;j)2f1;2g
2
p
ij

  t
1
((
i
; 
j
))  t
2
((
i
; 
j
)) + (
i
+ 
j
)x((
i
; 
j
))

subject to
(BIC) U
i
(
i
) 
X

 i
p(
 i
j
i
)

y
i
(
^

i
; 
 i
)  t
i
((
^

i
; 
 i
)) + 
i
x((
^

i
; 
 i
))

;8(
i
;
^

i
) 2 
2
;
(BIR) U
i
(
i
)  U
i
(
i
; e
i
) for some e
i
2 E(G; ~p
i
; p
 i
) 8
i
2 ;
2
X
k=1
y
k
(
i
; 
 i
) = 0; 8(
i
; 
 i
) 2 
2
:
Along an equilibrium path on which the side-contract S

is unanimously ratied, no
learning occurs since unanimous ratication is a pooling strategy. Since nothing is revealed
at the ratication stage, Bayesian incentive constraints and nal expected utilities are
computed with passive beliefs.
4.2 Weakly Collusion-Proof Mechanisms
Denition 2 : G is weakly collusion-proof if and only if it is a truthtelling direct mecha-
nism and the null side-mechanism S

0
= f

= Id; (y

k
= 0)
k2f1;2g
g is unanimously ratied
for (e

; e

; p; p), where e

is the truthful equilibrium of G played with passive beliefs.
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In other words, G is weakly collusion-proof if and only if the third-party oers the null
side-mechanism and there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
^
E(G;S

0
) such that
agents accept to play e

sustained with passive beliefs out of the equilibrium path.
Proposition 3 : To characterize the outcome of any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
game of grand-mechanism oer cum coalition formation such that a collusive continuation
equilibrium occurs on the equilibrium path, there is no loss of generality in restricting the
principal to oer weakly collusion-proof mechanisms.
The logic behind this weak collusion-proofness principle is similar to that underlying
the standard revelation principle: any equilibrium of the overall game of grand-mechanism
oer cum side-contracting gives an allocation which can be replicated with a direct grand-
mechanism G oered by the principal himself. This grand-mechanism is such that the
coalition still forms at the ratication stage of
^
 (G;S

0
) and each agent A
i
nds optimal
to report his valuation 
i
truthfully to the principal thereafter.
One could argue that agents' information is not only restricted to their own valuations
but also includes the knowledge of the side-mechanism they use to collude. The principal
could try to elicit this information by also asking the agents which side-mechanism they
are actually playing. But the third-party could react by inducing further manipulations of
those reports of the side-mechanism. These reactions and counterreactions lead naturally
to a problem of innite regress. By restricting the principal to use grand-mechanisms only
contingent on the agents' valuations, we cut arbitrarily this process in favor of the collud-
ing agents. This amounts to an incomplete contracting assumption which ts our desire to
give to collusive behavior its best chance.
19
Within this incompleteness contractual frame-
work, we are nevertheless able to generalize the revelation principle and benet from the
weak collusion-proofness principle to obtain a simple constructive characterization of the
set of implementable allocations.
The next proposition characterizes this set in the case of symmetric grand-mechanisms.
Proposition 4 : A symmetric grand-mechanism G is weakly collusion-proof if and only
if there exists  2 [0; 1[ such that:
 2t
11
+ 2

x   t
1
(
~

1
;
~

2
)  t
2
(
~

1
;
~

2
) + 2

x(
~

1
;
~

2
) 8(
~

1
;
~

2
) 2 
2
; (5)
 t
12
 t
21
+


+ 
p
11
p
12


x^   t
1
(
~

1
;
~

2
) t
2
(
~

1
;
~

2
)+


+ 
p
11
p
12


x(
~

1
;
~

2
) 8(
~

1
;
~

2
) 2 
2
;
(6)
 2t
22
+ 2

  
p
2
12
p
12
p
22
+ (p
11
p
22
  p
2
12
)


x^
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In a related multiprincipal context, Epstein and Peters (1997) show that a similar innite regress
may converge. This convergence would allow one to dene universal sets of types and universal complete
grand-mechanisms.
12
  t
1
(
~

1
;
~

2
) t
2
(
~

1
;
~

2
)+2

 
p
2
12
p
12
p
22
+ (p
11
p
22
  p
2
12
)


x(
~

1
;
~

2
) 8(
~

1
;
~

2
) 2 
2
; (7)
If  > 0, the Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint (1) of a

 agent is binding.
The weakly collusion-proof mechanisms described above are such that a  agent's
incentive constraint is not binding. Only a

 agent's incentive constraint may be binding.
These mechanisms are the only ones which are of interest as Proposition 5 will conrm.
The parameter  is a discount factor less than one which captures the fact that col-
lusion takes place under asymmetric information. True valuations must be replaced by
virtual valuations
20
in the coalition incentive constraints (6) and (7). The third-party
problem (T ) is constrained by the reservation utilities that the agents obtain from play-
ing non-cooperatively the grand-mechanism and the incentive compatibility constraint at
the coalition formation stage. Virtual valuations are then lower than true valuations to
take into account the costly multipliers of these constraints.
In the sequel, the downward coalition incentive constraints (rewritten after having
used the symmetry of the grand-mechanism) are of particular interest:
 2t
11
+ 2

x   t
12
  t
21
+ 2

x^; (8)
 t
12
  t
21
+


 +   
p
11
p
12


x^   2t
22
+


 +   
p
11
p
12


x: (9)
(8) says that a coalition made with two

 agents prefers telling collectively the truth to
the principal rather than lying and telling that one of the agents is . (9) says that a
(

; ) coalition prefers telling the truth rather than claiming that both agents are .
The logic of the rst-best non-cooperative implementation described in Section 2 is
to oer large penalties and large rewards depending on the states of nature to induce
revelation. For instance, the formula for t
11
(resp. t
22
) in the Appendix shows that this
tax may become extremely large and positive (resp. negative) when the agents' types are
less and less correlated. This suggests that the coalition incentive constraint (8) (resp.
(9)) is likely to be binding at the optimum of the principal's problem. The extent to
which the principal is restricted in using Bayesian transfers comes from the existence of
these coalition incentive constraints.
Once coalition incentive constraints are characterized, it is useful to derive necessary
monotonicity conditions for the implementability of a schedule of outputs.
Corollary 1 : For a weak correlation,   (p
12
+ p
22
)
p
2
12
p
11
, the schedule of implementable
outputs is increasing (x  x^  x) for all  2 [0; 1[. For a strong correlation,  >
(p
12
+ p
22
)
p
2
12
p
11
, the schedule of implementable outputs is non-monotonic (x  x  x^) if
and only if  () = 1 + 2
p
2
12
p
12
p
22
+(p
11
p
22
 p
2
12
)
 
p
11
p
12
 < 0, i.e., for  large enough, otherwise it
remains increasing.
20
See Myerson (1979) for the standard denition of virtual valuations.
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The striking feature of this corollary is that, in the case of strong correlation (i.e.,
when p
12
is small enough), non-monotonic schedules of outputs can be implemented by the
principal if he chooses  large enough. The reason for this non-monotonicity is that virtual
valuations coming from the formation of the coalition under asymmetric information are
no longer ranked in the same order as true valuations. When agents' types are almost
perfectly correlated, the probability that they both get a high-valuation for the public
good is large. Henceforth, the incentive constraint of a

 agent willing to mimic a  one at
the coalition formation stage is also very costly to the third-party from an ex ante point
of view. Inducing revelation within the coalition requires therefore large distortions of
the optimal manipulation of reports 

(;

) with respect to what the third-party could
implement under symmetric information. Hence, the sum of the virtual valuations of a
(;

) coalition may become smaller than that of a (; ) one.
This non-monotonicity property will create a substantive dierence between collusion
under symmetric and asymmetric information when the correlation is strong contrary to
the case of a weak correlation.
5 The Optimal Weakly Collusion-Proof Mechanism
We now turn to some normative analysis and optimize the principal's welfare subject to
Bayesian individual incentive, participation and coalition incentive constraints. In the
sequel, we focus only on the

 agent's Bayesian incentive constraint (1), the downward
coalition incentive constraints (8) and (9) and the  agent's participation constraint (5).
21
Before writing the principal's problem, let us rst introduce four new variables u =
 t
11
+

x; u^
1
=  t
12
+

x^; u^
2
=  t
21
+ x^; u =  t
22
+ x: These are the ex post
rents obtained by both types of agent in each possible state of nature. Rearranging
expected social welfare, individual and coalitional incentive and participation constraints
as functions of these variables, the principal's problem (P ) rewrites as:
max
fx();ug
p
11

(1 + )(2

x  c(x))  2u

+ 2p
12

(1 + )((

 + )x^  c(x^))  (u^
1
+ u^
2
)

+p
22

(1 + )(2x  c(x))  2u

;
subject to
(BIC) p
11
u+ p
12
u^
1
 p
11
u^
2
+ p
12
u+(p
11
x^+ p
12
x) (10)
(CIC)
1
2u  u^
1
+ u^
2
+x^ (11)
(CIC)
2
u^
1
+ u^
2
 2u +x+
p
11
p
12
(x^  x) (12)
(IR) p
12
u^
2
+ p
22
u  0: (13)
21
We check ex post that all other constraints are indeed satised.
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 For a weak correlation,   (p
12
+ p
22
)
p
2
12
p
11
, the monotonicity condition derived from the
coalition incentive constraints is
x  x^  x:
 For a strong correlation,   (p
12
+ p
22
)
p
2
12
p
11
, the monotonicity condition becomes
x  x^  x if and only if  ()  0 and x  x  x^ otherwise:
In the sequel, we focus separately on these two polar cases of weak and strong correlations.
5.1 Weak Correlation
Solving the principal's problem with standard Lagrangean technics yields:
Proposition 5 : Assuming that 0    (p
12
+ p
22
)
p
2
12
p
11
, the symmetric optimal weakly
collusion-proof mechanism G

entails:
 A strictly decreasing schedule of outputs x
c
> x^
c
> x
c
with no distortion at the top"
x
c
= x

and downward distortions with respect to the no collusion outcome otherwise:
x^
c
< x^

and x
c
< x

where
c
0
(x^
c
) =

 +   

1 + 

p
11
2p
12

1 +
p
12
p
12
+ 

(14)
c
0
(x
c
) = 2  

1 + 

1
p
22

p
11
+ 2p
12
 
p
12
p
11
p
12
+ 

: (15)
 The Bayesian incentive constraint of a

 agent (10) is always binding. The downward
coalition incentive constraints (11) and (12) are both strictly binding when  > 0. The
participation constraint of a  agent (13) is also binding. All remaining constraints are
strictly satised. A

 agent gets a strictly positive informational rent.
Binding Constraints: The fact that both coalitions (

;

) and (;

) are prevented
from misreporting limits the feasible transfers that could be used by the principal to
extract the agents' information. t
11
cannot be made largely positive as it is in the no-
collusion outcome without violating the coalition incentive constraint (11). A (

;

) coali-
tion would like to avoid bearing these detrimental punishments by mimicking a (

; )
coalition. (11) must be binding at the optimum. Similarly, a (

; ) coalition would like
to mimic a (; ) one to get the corresponding large rewards requested in the no-collusion
outcome since t
22
is then large and negative. (12) must thus also be binding.
Because of these constraints on the set of transfers, a

 agent must be given a strictly
positive rent contrary to the case without collusion. Large rewards and punishments can
no longer be used by the principal without violating the coalition incentive constraints.
Coalition Incentive Constraints: For a weak correlation,  = 0 at the optimum.
Indeed, there is no gain in having  strictly positive since this would only increase the cost
15
of the coalition incentive constraint (12).
22
Interestingly, the binding collusion-proofness
constraints take therefore the same form as if agents could credibly share their information
within the coalition. Everything happens as if asymmetric information does not really
undermine the ability of the group to form. However, the agents' participation constraints
being the interim ones, they dier from the case of symmetric information within the
coalition.
Output Distortions: Distorting downward x^ and x below their rst-best values
reduces the costs of the individual (10) and coalitional incentive (11) and (12) constraints.
The size of the public good must be reduced because of asymmetric information and
collusion. Note that this result contrasts with the usual free-rider phenomenon discussed
in the literature. As shown for instance in Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), the reduction
in the size of the public good is then due to the conict between individual incentive and
individual participation constraints. Here, distortions come from the conict between
coalitional incentive and individual participation constraints. It is because a coalition can
form that individual incentives become costly to provide and that allocative distortions
are needed in this correlated environment.
Role of the Correlation: This conict between coalition incentive and participation
constraints increases with the amount of positive correlation between the agents' types.
When types are more positively correlated, the distortion required on x^
c
to reduce the
cost of the coalition incentive constraint (11) is larger since p
12
is smaller (see (14)). The
distortion on x
c
needed to reduce the cost of the coalition incentive constraint (12) is
instead rather small since p
22
is now relatively large (see (15)).
Ex post Rents: Ex post rents in the optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanism
satisfy:
u < u^
2
+x^
c
(16)
u^
1
> u+x
c
(17)
u^
2
< 0 (18)
u > u^
1
(19)
u > 0 (20)
u^
2
> u x
c
(21)
u > u^
1
 x^
c
: (22)
(16) and (17) indicate that the truthful strategy of a

 agent is Bayesian. Indeed (16)
shows that a

 agent A
1
never wants to tell the truth if he is sure of facing a

 agent A
2
.
Instead, (17) shows that he always tells the truth if he is sure that A
2
claims . Contrary
22
In other words, the Bayesian incentive constraint in the third-party problem (T ) is not tight at the
optimum. This does not mean that (10) is not costly for the principal since he has a dierent objective
function than that of the third-party.
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to what happens in the no-collusion outcome where in fact u < u^
1
, a

 agent is now
rewarded when he faces a

 agent A
2
and punished when he faces a  agent A
2
. It is only
because these rewards cover in expectation the penalties that a

 agent A
1
weakly prefers
to tell the truth to the principal.
Instead, (21) and (22) show that the optimal weakly collusion-proof contract is such
that the dominant strategy incentive constraints of a  agent are always strictly satised.
This dominant strategy requirement for one type somewhat simplies the optimal mecha-
nism since this type's equilibrium strategy is not sensitive to the exact beliefs that agents
have at the time of playing the mechanism.
Nevertheless, the ex post rent of a  agent A
1
depends also explicitly on A
2
's type.
For instance, just as in the no collusion outcome, two  agents are given strictly positive
ex post rents. These agents are still subsidized for the consumption of the public good.
On the contrary, a  agent A
1
facing a

 agent A
2
makes a negative ex post prot. The
tax he pays for the public good is very large and his nal utility is negative. Intuitively,
by setting u^
2
negative, the principal insures that (11) is not very costly. Satisfying the 
agent's interim participation constraint requires then to set u strictly above zero.
5.2 The Polar Case of No Correlation
In the degenerate case of no correlation, a rather striking result obtains:
Proposition 6 : With no correlation between the agents' types ( = 0), the optimal
weakly collusion-proof grand-mechanism G

entails the same strictly decreasing schedule
of outputs as without collusion, x
c
0
= x

0
, x^
c
0
= x^

0
and x
c
0
= x

0
.
Only the individual incentive (10) and the participation constraints (13) are strictly
binding. The multipliers of the coalition incentive constraints (11) and (12) are zero
at the optimum of (P ). Non-anonymous transfers implement in a Bayesian and weakly
collusion-proof way the optimal second-best contract, i.e., the non-cooperative outcome
obtained when there is no correlation between the agents' types. Collusion has no impact
when agents do not know more information on each other than what is available to the
principal. Intuitively, everything happens as if the principal sells the mechanism to the
third-party so that the latter perfectly internalizes the social welfare objective.
Strikingly, the optimal policy moves continuously from the case with positive corre-
lation to the case without correlation when coalition incentive constraints are taken into
account. Allowing collusion restores continuity of the optimal contract with respect to the
information structure. For any degree of positive correlation, there are enough binding
constraints to pin down the values of the optimal transfers in all states of nature. When
the degree of correlation converges to zero, these transfers converge and the limiting trans-
fers implement the second-best outcome in a collusion-proof way. Not only the expected
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values of these limiting transfers but also their precise values in all states of nature are
now perfectly determined even in the case of no correlation.
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5.3 The Polar Case of Almost Perfect Correlation
With an almost perfect correlation, (p
12
close to zero), both agents have almost always
the same type.
As a benchmark, suppose rst that the agents can credibly exchange information on
their types because, for instance, the third-party is endowed with a technology making
this information veriable within the coalition. Assume also that agents agree to play
the grand-mechanism before they learn each other types so that their participation con-
straints remain unchanged with respect to 5.1. Collusion-proofness constraints must now
be written with true valuations instead of virtual ones. This has two implications: First,
the binding downward coalition-proofness constraints take the same form as (11) and (12)
when  = 0. Second, monotonicity of the schedule of outputs (x  x^  x) is now always
necessary for implementability.
If this monotonicity constraint would not be binding at the optimum, the optimal
levels of public good would still be given by (14) and (15). However, when p
12
is small
enough, it is easy to check that the monotonicity constraint x^  x would be violated.
Hence, we get:
Proposition 7 : With almost perfect correlation between the agents' types (p
12
small
enough but positive) and symmetric information within the coalition, the optimal weakly
collusion-proof grand-mechanism G

entails partial pooling x
c
= x

> x^
c
= x
c
= x
cP
with
x
cP
dened by:
c
0
(x^
cP
) = 2
p
22
 + p
12
( +

)
2p
12
+ p
22
  2

1 + 


p
11
+ p
12
2p
12
+ p
22

: (23)
Taking into account collusion-proofness constraints under symmetric information in an
almost perfectly correlated environment undermines quite signicantly the achievement
of the ecient outcome. The optimal allocation entails now lots of pooling. When the
agents' types are strongly correlated, we have seen in Section 2 that rewards and punish-
ments necessary to implement the rst-best outcome are relatively small. However, when
agents collude under symmetric information, their collusion becomes now also harder to
prevent. As a result, the optimal collusion-proof mechanism becomes less responsive to
their messages. In this framework, the optimal contract looks like an incomplete contract
making only partial use of the information.
24
23
Coalition incentive constraints somehow compactify the set of feasible allocations just as risk-aversion
or limited liability does (see Robert (1991)).
24
A last interpretation is worth stressing. Assume that the agents' types are now perfectly correlated
(p
12
= 0). The optimal pooling allocation becomes c
0
(x
cP
) = 2   2

1+
p
11
p
22
: This is the optimal
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Things are quite dierent under asymmetric information within the coalition. For
a strong correlation, non-monotonic schedules of outputs can be implemented by the
principal if  is large enough. Because now x^ < x, the collusion-proofness constraint (12)
is relaxed when  is as large as possible. An upper bound of the principal's welfare obtains
therefore for  = 1.
Proposition 8 : With almost perfect correlation and asymmetric information within the
coalition, the optimal weakly collusion-proof grand-mechanism G

entails: x
c
= x

> x
c
>
x^
c
= 0 with x
c
dened by:
c
0
(x
c
) = 2  

1 + 
2p
12
p
22
:
The expected rent of the

 agent is
p
11
u+p
12
u^
1
p
11
+p
12
=
p
12
p
11
+p
12
x
c
: Moreover, u^
2
= u = 0,
u^
1
=

1  
p
11
p
12

x
c
and u = x
c
.
For a strong correlation, the principal can now oer non-monotonic schedules of ouputs
in a collusion-proof way. In particular, cancelling the production of the public good when
agents' types are dierent and still keeping a positive production when types are the same
becomes a valuable option. This strategy is not very costly from an ex ante allocative point
of view since p
12
is small. However, it relaxes quite signicantly (12) when  is positive.
In the limiting case where p
12
is almost zero, the R.H.S. of (12) is so largely negative that
this coalition incentive constraint does not matter any more for the principal. u^
1
can be
set at a very large negative value and still this constraint can be easily satised. Choosing
such a punishment in case of dierent reports also relaxes quite signicantly (11) and the
principal's problem is almost as without collusion.
Since collusion does not aect too much social welfare, the principal can set x
c
to a
level close to its rst best value x

. The punishment for claiming to have dierent types
are so eective that a

 agent's expected rent is now close to zero. Therefore, with almost
perfect correlation, the optimal collusion-proof contract achieves an ex ante social welfare
close to its full information value.
6 Robustness
We focus in this section on the case of a small correlation.
6.1 Multiplicity of Equilibria of G

When played with passive beliefs, the optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanism G

has
several pure strategy equilibria, i.e., jE(G

; p; p)j > 1. The rst one is the truthful sym-
distortion in a one principal-agent model where the principal is facing directly a third-party endowed
with a utility function being the sum of the agents' utility functions.
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metric equilibrium e

that we have derived above. However, there exist also two asym-
metric non-truthful pure strategy equilibria. e

1
(resp. e

2
) is one such equilibrium where
A
1
(resp. A
2
) always claims to be a  agent and A
2
(resp. A
1
) reveals truthfully his type.
Indeed, from (21) and (22), a  agent always claims truthfully his type. A

 agent
A
2
anticipates that A
1
always claims . Then, from (17), he reports truthfully. Thus,
agent A
2
always reveals his type. Anticipating that A
2
always reveal his type, from the
binding constraint (10), a

 agent A
1
is indierent between lying or not and lies in this
equilibrium.
In this asymmetric equilibrium, denoted thereafter e

1
, A
1
gets the same ex ante and
interim payos as in e

, U
1
(
1
; e

1
) = U(
1
) for all 
1
. Instead, A
2
's interim payos dier
from that in e

. Indeed, we have U
2
(

; e

1
) = u^
1
< U(

) =
p
11
u+p
12
u^
1
p
11
+p
12
(from (19)) and
U
2
(; e

1
) = u > U() = 0 (from (20)). However, using the values of ex post rents given in
the Appendix, A
2
's ex ante payo is the same as in e

.
In fact, in equilibrium e

1
, a (

; ) coalition reports (; ) when it is indierent between
collectively claiming (

; ) and (; ) ((12) is indeed binding for the ex post rents dened
by G

). This indierence of the coalition is broken in favor of the principal so that, among
all payo equivalent equilibria from the third-party's point of view, the agents play the
most preferred by the principal. The fact that E(G

; p; p) is not a singleton is not a big
problem since all these equilibria yield the same aggregate payo to the agents.
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6.2 Strong Collusion-Proofness
The fact that E(G

; p; p) is not a singleton shows also that G

is never strongly collusion-
proof, i.e.,
^
E(G

; S

0
) is not reduced to a singleton either. Indeed, there exist other equi-
libria of
^
 (G

; S

0
) than unanimous ratication and subsequent play of e

. To show this
result, it is enough to exhibit such an equilibrium of
^
 (G

; S

0
). Unanimous veto of S

0
and subsequent play of the equilibrium e

1
is such an equilibrium of
^
 (G

; S

0
) sustained
with passive beliefs.
This observation suggests two things. First, the ratication stage enlarges the set of
equilibria of G

. Second, we should test the robustness of G

to credible equilibria of the
game of coalition formation. We now turn to this issue.
6.3 Strong Ratiability
As we have seen above, the ratication stage of
^
 (G

; S

0
) adds in fact a preplay commu-
nication stage to G

. At this stage, agents are allowed to make binary preplay announce-
ments (Veto" or Accept") which may signal some information on their types. Cramton
25
This contrasts with Ma, Moore and Turnbull (1988) where Pareto-dominant non-cooperative and non-
truthful equilibria may be a threat to the principal and must therefore be eliminated by using indirect
message games.
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and Palfrey (1995) have analyzed similar mechanism design problems and have proposed
the notion of strong ratiability of a mechanism against itself to test its robustness to such
a cheap-talk stage.
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To understand this notion, let us rst dene credible veto beliefs:
Denition 3 : A belief system f~p
1
; ~p
2
g on  is a credible veto system of the truthful
decision rule e

if, for each i, there exist a non-cooperative Bayesian equilibrium e
i
2
E(G

; ~p
i
; p
 i
) (with e
i
6= e

) and refusal probabilities v
i
(
i
), 8
i
2 ;8i 2 f1; 2g which
together satisfy:
1. v
i
(
i
) > 0 for some 
i
2 ;
2. v
i
(
i
) = 1 for all 
i
2  such that U(
i
) < U
i
(
i
; e
i
)
3. v
i
(
i
) = 0 for all 
i
2  such that: U(
i
) > U
i
(
i
; e
i
)
4. ~p
i
satises Bayes' rule, given the prior distribution p and the refusal probabilities
v
i
():
~p
i
(
i
j
j
) =
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
p(
i
j
j
)v
i
(
i
)
X

k
2
i
;v(
k
)>0
p(
k
j
j
)v
k
(
k
)
for 
i
such that v
i
(
i
) > 0
0 for 
i
such that v
i
(
i
) = 0:
Credibility of beliefs requires that vetoing e

should be interpreted as coming from the
subset of types who are the most likely to benet from this deviation when a non-deviant
agent's beliefs put all weight on this particular subset. This denition captures the ratio-
nal expectation reasoning that the dierent types of the deviant agent make when they
envision vetoing the decision rule e

. Those types who gain from vetoing e

eectively
deviate and refuse to play e

with some probability when the non-deviant agent interprets
these deviations in a rational way. The set of such types is called a credible veto set. Still
following Cramton and Palfrey (1995), let also dene:
Denition 4 : G

is strongly ratiable if and only if there does not exist a credible veto
system or, if for all credible veto sets and all credible veto beliefs ~p
i
, there exists a non-
cooperative equilibrium e
i
2 E(G

; ~p
i
; p
 i
) such that U(
i
) = U
i
(
i
; e
i
) for all i and for
all 
i
belonging to the credible veto set.
Strong ratiability captures the idea that no type of agent is willing to credibly veto
the play of the truthful equilibrium e

. If it is strongly ratiable,G

is robust to cheap-talk
equilibria such that (possibly strict) subsets of types may deviate in a credible way.
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See Matthews and Postlewaite (1989) and Palfrey and Srivastava (1991) for other analyses allowing
more general cheap-talk stages in mechanism design.
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Denition 3 is actually a step in the construction of perfect sequential equilibria made
by Grossman and Perry (1986). Therefore, G

is strongly ratiable if and only if all
perfect sequential equilibria of
^
 (G

; S

0
) are payo equivalent to unanimous ratication
of e

.
Proposition 9 : The optimal weakly collusion-proof grand-mechanism G

is strongly
ratiable.
The proof consists in describing the equilibrium correspondence E(G

; ~p
1
; p
2
) when
~p
1
varies. From now on, we abuse notations and denote by ~p
1
(resp. p) the probability
(resp. the conditional prior probability) that A
2
assigns to A
1
being

. Starting from
E(G

; p; p) = fe

; e

1
; e

2
g, we get E(G

; ~p
1
; p) = fe

2
g for optimistic beliefs ~p
1
> p and
E(G

; ~p
1
; p) = fe

; e

1
g for pessimistic beliefs ~p
1
< p.
The charaterization of this correspondence makes easier to isolate the veto sets which
can credibly refuse to play e

. A

 agent A
1
cannot be a credible veto set since G

has a unique equilibrium e

2
when A
2
holds optimistic beliefs on A
1
and this equilibrium
gives to a

 agent A
1
strictly less utility than e

. On the contrary, a  agent A
1
can
be a credible veto set since G

has e

and e

1
for equilibria when A
2
holds pessimistic
beliefs on A
1
. However, by refusing to ratify e

, this credible veto set cannot obtain more
utility than following unanimous ratication of e

since, with pessimistic beliefs, we have
E(G

; ~p
1
; p) = fe

; e

1
g and both equilibria yield payo U
1
(; e

1
) = U() to a  agent A
1
anyway.
7 Conclusion
When agents collude to inuence collective decision on public goods and their valuations
for the public good are positively correlated, there exists a trade-o between eciency
and rent extraction. The optimal weakly collusion-proof contract depends on the degree
of correlation.
This correlation is also a crucial determinant of the group's ability to collude. In
particular, a strong positive correlation allows the principal to use asymmetric information
within the coalition to undermine signicantly its countervailing power.
Adding coalition incentive constraints restores also continuity between the correlated
and the uncorrelated information environments. Collusion does not matter in an uncor-
related environment with risk-neutral agents and the non-cooperative outcome is imple-
mentable in a collusion-proof way.
The benet from focusing on a discrete two type modeling of asymmetric information
is twofold. First, it has rst given us a tractable characterization of the set of collusion-
proofness constraints. Second, it is also a key simplication to test the robustness of
the optimal mechanism to some form of preplay communication since it becomes then
22
possible to fully describe the equilibrium correspondence of the optimal weak collusion-
proof mechanism G

when beliefs change.
Many lessons of this paper are independent of the specics of the model, like the princi-
pal's objective function or the preferences of agents within the coalition. Therefore, these
results would also go through in other environments like auctions, regulation of duopoly,
design of incentive schemes within the rm and arbitration mechanisms. More generally,
our results suggest that collusion stakes always exist in those correlated environments
and that the eciency of yardstick mechanisms depend signicantly on the amount of
correlation.
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Figure 1: Game Tree
(U
1
(
1
; e

); U
2
(
2
; e

))
(U
1
(
1
; e
2
); U
2
(
2
; e
2
))
(U
1
(
1
; e
1
); U
2
(
2
; e
1
))
(U
1
(
1
; e
0
); U
2
(
2
; e
0
))
 (G  S; p; p)
 (G; ~p
1
; p)
 (G; p; ~p
2
)
 (G; ~p
1
; ~p
2
)























H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
Y
N
Y
N
A
2




Y N

A
1
?
S
T
 
 
 @
@
@  
 
 @
@
@
 
 
 
 
@
@
@
@



Y
N NY
(0; 0) (0; 0) (0; 0)
A
2
Y N

A
1
?

?
Nature (
1
; 
2
)
G
P
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
9
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
=
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
;
^
 (G;S)

26
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: When (3) and (4) are binding the principal's expected welfare
rewrites as SW = (1 + )

p
11
(2

x   c(x)) + 2p
12

(

 + )x^  c(x^)

+ p
22
(2x  c(x))

if
there exist transfers such that the incentive compatibility constraints (1) and (2) hold.
Optimizing this expression yields the rst-best decision rule. Since we look for transfers
such that (1) and (2) are also binding, (t
11
; t
12
; t
21
; t
22
) must solve:
p
11
t
11
+ p
12
t
12
=

(p
11
x+ p
12
x^); (24)
p
11
t
21
+ p
12
t
22
=

(p
11
x^+ p
12
x); (25)
p
12
t
21
+ p
22
t
22
= (p
12
x^+ p
22
x); (26)
p
12
t
11
+ p
22
t
12
= (p
12
x+ p
22
x^): (27)
Those equalities are satised for some transfers when the matrix
 
p
11
p
12
p
12
p
22
!
is invertible. This holds since its determinant is  = p
11
p
22
 p
2
12
> 0. Solving for the taxes:
t
11
=
1



(p
11
x+p
12
x^)p
22
 (p
12
x+p
22
x^)p
12

; t
12
=
1


(p
12
x+p
22
x^)p
11
 

(p
11
x+p
12
x^)p
12

;
t
21
=
1



(p
11
x^ + p
12
x)p
22
  (p
12
x^ + p
22
x)p
12

; t
22
=
1


(p
12
x^ + p
22
x)p
11
 

(p
11
x^ +
p
12
x)p
12

: These taxes become very large as  goes to zero. Indeed, we have  t
11
+

x =
 
1

p
12
(p
12
x + p
22
x^); and  t
22
+ x =
1

p
12
(p
11
x^ + p
12
x): Hence, t
11
goes towards
plus innity and t
22
goes towards minus innity when  goes to zero. Similarly, t
21
goes
towards plus innity and t
12
goes towards minus innity when  goes to zero.
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof is standard and thus omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3: Let us consider a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
overall game of grand-mechanism oer cum coalition formation such that a side-contract
is unanimously ratied. This P.B.E is in fact a triplet fG

;S

; (~p
1
; ~p
2
)g where:
 G

fromM =M
1
M
2
into D = XT
2
maps the messages (m
1
;m
2
) sent by the agents
into an allocation (public good, taxes). G

maximizes the principal's welfare taking into
account the continuation equilibrium of the game of coalition formation.
 S

is a side-mechanism which, since the revelation principle applies at the last stage
of the game, can be taken as being a direct mechanism mapping    into the set of
measures on message spaces. Let e

be its truthful equilibrium. S

maximizes the sum of
the agents' expected utilities subject to individual Bayesian incentive constraints, budget
balance and individual rationality constraints U
i
(
i
)  U
i
(
i
; e
i
) for some e
i
2 E(G; ~p
i
; p
 i
)
and some f~p
1
; ~p
2
g:
 f~p
1
; ~p
2
g is the system of out-of equilibrium posterior beliefs used respectively by agent
A
2
and A
1
to assess respectively A
1
and A
2
's type following their respective veto of the
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side-mechanismS

. These are the beliefs used in the non-cooperative play ofG to compute
the status quo payos U
i
(
i
; e
i
).
 Consider now the new grand-mechanism
~
G = G

 S

. We prove that there exists a
P.B.E. of the overall game of contract oer cum coalition formation in which the principal
oers
~
G which is a direct mechanism from  into D = X T
2
, the third-party oers
the null side-mechanism S

0
= f = Id; y
k
= 0g and this choice is sustained by passive
beliefs, ~p
1
= ~p
2
= p. Because S

solves (T ) with reservation utilities U
i
(
i
; e
i
), the null
side-mechanism solves (T ) with reservation utilities U
i
(
i
). Indeed, suppose it is not the
case, then there would exist a side-mechanism
~
S such that the third-party can achieve a
strictly greater payo for the coalition than with S

. Since by denition U
i
(
i
)  U
i
(
i
; e
i
)
the third-party's payo from oering S


~
S in the rst place would be strictly greater
than that achieved with S

. This would contradict that S

is optimal when G

is oered.
 Hence, oering the grand-mechanism
~
G insures to the principal that there is a P.B.E.
of the continuation game sustained with passive beliefs in which the null-side-mechanism
is unanimously ratied.
Proof of Proposition 4 and Corollary 1: We rst solve for the third-party's
optimal side-mechanism sustained by a reversion to a non-cooperative equilibrium of
the mechanism G() played with passive beliefs. Then, we identify conditions such that
S

0
= f = Id; y
k
= 0g, i.e., the null side-mechanism, is the solution to (T ). We conclude
by deriving the monotonicity conditions that must be satised by such a weakly collusion-
proof contract.
 Since, we are not interested in grand-mechanisms such that the  agent incentive con-
straint is binding (this constraint will be satised ex post), we write the third-party's
problem as (the lowerscript denotes the index of the agent concerned with the transfer
and let (
i
; 
j
) = 
ij
for simplicity):
max
f();y()g
X
(i;j)2f1;2g
2
p
ij

  t
1
(
ij
)  t
2
(
ij
) + (
i
+ 
j
)x(
ij
)

subject to
 Budget-balance:
2
X
k=1
y
k
(
i
; 
j
) = 0 8(
i
; 
j
) 2 
2
; (28)
 Incentive constraints for respectively the

 agents A
1
and A
2
:
p
11

  t
1
(
11
)  y
1
(

;

) +

x(
11
)

+ p
12

  t
1
(
12
)  y
1
(

; ) +

x(
12
)

 p
11

  t
1
(
21
)  y
1
(;

) +

x(
21
)

+ p
12

  t
1
(
22
)  y
1
(; ) +

x(
22
)

; (29)
p
11

  t
2
(
11
)  y
2
(

;

) +

x(
11
)

+ p
21

  t
2
(
21
)  y
2
(;

) +

x(
21
)

 p
11

  t
2
(
12
)  y
2
(

; ) +

x(
12
)

+ p
21

  t
2
(
22
)  y
2
(; ) +

x(
22
)

; (30)
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 Participation constraints for respectively the

 agents A
1
and A
2
:
p
11

 t
1
(
11
) y
1
(

;

)+

x(
11
)

+p
12

 t
1
(
12
) y
1
(

; )+

x(
12
)

 (p
11
+p
12
)U
1
(

; e
1
);
(31)
p
11

 t
2
(
11
) y
2
(

;

)+

x(
11
)

+p
21

 t
2
(
21
) y
2
(;

)+

x(
21
)

 (p
11
+p
21
)U
2
(

; e
2
);
(32)
for some equilibria e
i
2  (G; p; p) (i 2 f1; 2g).
 Participation constraints for respectively the  agents A
1
and A
2
:
p
21

 t
1
(
21
) y
1
(;

)+x(
21
)

+p
22

 t
1
(
22
) y
1
(; )+x(
22
)

 (p
21
+p
22
)U
1
(; e
1
);
(33)
p
12

 t
2
(
12
) y
2
(

; )+x(
12
)

+p
22

 t
2
(
22
) y
2
(; )+x(
22
)

 (p
12
+p
22
)U
2
(; e
2
):
(34)
Let introduce the following multipliers  (
i
; 
j
) for (28), 
i
for (29) and (30). 
i
for (31)
and (32) 
i
for (33) and (34). We write the Lagrangean L of the maximization problem
above as:
L = E(U
1
+U
2
)+
2
X
i=1

i
(BIC)
i
(

)+
2
X
i=1

i
(BIR)
i
(

)+
2
X
i=1

i
(BIR)
i
()+
X
(
i
;
j
)
 (
i
; 
j
) (BB) (
i
; 
j
):
Optimizing with respect to y
1
(

;

) and y
2
(

;

) yields respectively:
 (

;

)  p
11
(
1
+ 
1
) = 0; (35)
 (

;

)  p
11
(
2
+ 
2
) = 0: (36)
Optimizing with respect to y
1
(

; ) and y
2
(

; ) yields respectively:
 (

; )  p
12
(
1
+ 
1
) = 0; (37)
 (

; ) + p
11

2
  p
12

2
= 0: (38)
Optimizing with respect to y
1
(;

) and y
2
(;

) yields respectively:
 (;

) + p
11

1
  p
21

1
= 0; (39)
 (;

) + p
21
(
2
+ 
2
) = 0: (40)
Finally, optimizing with respect to y
1
(; ) and y
2
(; ) yields respectively:
 (; ) + p
12

1
  p
22

1
= 0; (41)
 (; ) + p
21

2
  p
22

2
= 0: (42)
 Optimizing with respect to 
11
yields:


11
2 argmax
~

11
p
11

  t
1
(
~

11
)  t
2
(
~

11
) + 2

x(
~

11
)

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+(
1
+ 
1
)p
11

  t
1
(
~

11
) +

x(
~

11
)

+ (
2
+ 
2
)p
11

  t
2
(
~

11
) +

x(
~

11
)

:
Taking into account (35) and (36), 
1
+ 
1
= 
2
+ 
2
, and simplifying yields:


11
2 argmax
~

11

 t
1
(
~

11
)  t
2
(
~

11
) + 2

x(
~

11
)

: (43)
 Optimizing with respect to 
12
yields:


12
2 argmax
~

12
p
12

  t
1
(
~

12
)   t
2
(
~

12
) + (

 + )x(
~

12
)

+p
12
(
1
+ 
1
)

  t
1
(
~

12
) +

x(
~

12
)

  
2
p
11

  t
2
(
~

12
) +

x(
~

12
)

+
2
p
12

  t
2
(
~

12
) + x(
~

12
)

: (44)
Using (37) and (38), 
1
+ 
1
=  
2
p
11
p
12
+ 
2
: Inserting into (44) yields:


12
2 argmax
~

12
 
 t
1
(
~

12
)  t
2
(
~

12
) +


 +   
p
11

1
p
12


x(
~

12
)
!
(45)
with 
1
=

2
1+
1
+
1
: Similarly


21
2 argmax
~

21
 
 t
1
(
~

21
)  t
2
(
~

21
) +


 +   
p
11

2
p
21


x(
~

21
)
!
(46)
with 
2
=

1
1+
2
+
2
:
 Optimizing with respect to 
22
yields:


22
2 arg max
~

22
p
22

  t
1
(
~

22
)  t
2
(
~

22
) + 2x(
~

22
)

+ p
22

1

  t
1
(
~

22
) + x(
~

22
)

+p
22

2

 t
2
(
~

22
)+x(
~

22
)

 p
12

1

 t
1
(
~

22
)+

x(
~

22
)

 p
21

2

 t
2
(
~

22
)+

x(
~

22
)

: (47)
Note again that 
1
+ 
1
=  
2
p
11
p
12
+ 
2
and 
2
+ 
2
=  
1
p
11
p
12
+ 
1
. Using (41) and
(42), one also gets p
22
(1 + 
1
)   p
12

1
= p
22
(1 + 
2
)   p
12

2
= p
22

1 + 
1
+ 
1

+

2

p
12
=
p
22

1 + 
2
+ 
2

+

1

p
12
= B. Simplifying into (47) yields then:


22
2 argmax
~

22
 
 t
1
(
~

22
)  t
2
(
~

22
) + 2x(
~

22
) 
(
1
+ 
2
)p
12
B
x(
~

22
)
!
:
Put dierently,


22
2 arg max
~

22
0
@
 t
1
(
~

22
)  t
2
(
~

22
) +
0
@
2  

1
p
12
p
22
+ 
1

p
12
  

2
p
12
p
22
+ 
2

p
12

1
A
x(
~

22
)
1
A
:
(48)
In the sequel, we consider symmetric grand-mechanisms such that 
1
= 
2
=  and
t
1
(
1
; 
2
) = t
2
(
2
; 
1
).
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We then have:


22
2 argmax
~

22
0
@
 t
1
(
~

22
)  t
2
(
~

22
) + 2
0
@
  
p
12
p
22
+ 

p
12

1
A
x(
~

22
)
1
A
: (49)
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Asymmetric mechanisms are discussed in the Proof of Proposition 5.
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 In a weakly collusion-proof mechanism 

ij
= (
i
; 
j
). Inserting into (43), (45), (46) and
(49) yields constraints (5), (6) and (7).
 Note that  =

1++
2 [0; 1[: Moreover,  > 0 when the Bayesian incentive constraints
(29) and (30) are binding in (T ).
 Note also that (31), (32), (33) and (34) are binding for a weakly collusion-proof mech-
anism. Hence, for such a mechanism, the slackness conditions obtained from the La-
grangean's optimization do not give any information on . Therefore, the principal has
some exibility in choosing this variable.
 We now check for the monotonicity of the schedule of outputs when the mechanism is
weakly collusion-proof. From (43) and (44) taken for 

ij
= (
i
; 
j
), we have:
 2t
11
+ 2

x   t
12
  t
21
+ 2

x^
 t
12
  t
21
+


 +   
p
11
p
12


x^   2t
11
+


 +   
p
11
p
12


x:
Summing these two inequalities yields

1+
p
11
p
12


(x x^)  0; which is satised for x  x^
(since   0). Proceeding in a similar way and using (44) and (49) for the coalitions (

; )
and (; ), another revealed preference argument tells us that

1 +
2p
2
12

p
12
p
22
+(p
11
p
22
 p
2
12
)
 
p
11

p
12

(x^ x)  0: Denoting by  () the rst term on the left-hand-side of the latter inequality.
 () is concave in  (since  
00
() =
 4p
3
12
p
22

(p
12
p
22
+)
3
< 0). Hence, it is either minimum at 0 or
1.  (0) = 1 > 0 and  (1) > 0 if and only if  < (p
22
+ p
12
)
p
2
12
p
11
. For a weak correlation,
namely  < (p
22
+p
12
)
p
2
12
p
11
,  () is always positive and the monotonicity condition becomes
x^  x. For a strong correlation, namely  > (p
22
+ p
12
)
p
2
12
p
11
,  () is negative for  close
enough to one and the monotonicity condition becomes then x  x^.
Proof of Proposition 5:
 We denote by ; ; ; , the multipliers respectively of (10), (11), (12) and (13).
Optimizing with respect to u yields:
2p
11
= p
11
+ 2: (50)
Optimizing with respect to u^
1
yields:
2p
12
= p
12
   + : (51)
Optimizing with respect to u^
2
yields:
2p
12
=  p
11
   +  + p
12
: (52)
Optimizing with respect to u yields:
2p
22
=  p
12
  2 + p
22
: (53)
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Summing (50) to (53) yields:
 =
2
p
12
+ p
22
> 0: (54)
Inserting this latter expression into (52) yields:
2p
12

1 
1
p
12
+ p
22

=  p
11
   + : (55)
Subtracting (51) from (55) yields:
 =
2p
12
(p
12
+ p
22
)(p
11
+ p
12
)
> 0: (56)
Inserting this expression into (50) yields then:
 = p
11

1  
p
12
(p
12
+ p
22
)(p
12
+ p
11
)

> 0: (57)
 and  are strictly positive when  = (p
12
+ p
22
)(p
12
+ p
11
)  p
12
> 0: Finally, inserting
(57) into (51) gives:
 = (p
11
+ 2p
12
)

1  
p
12
(p
12
+ p
22
)(p
12
+ p
11
)

> 0: (58)
 Since  > 0 and since the monotonicity condition implies that x^   x  0 for a weak
correlation,  = 0 minimizes the cost of constraint (12).
 Optimizing with respect to x; x^ and x yields c
0
(x) = 2

; c
0
(x^) =

+  
1
1+
1
2p
12
(p
11
+
); and c
0
(x) = 2  
1
1+
1
p
22
(p
12
+ ): Using (56), (57) and (58) yields (14) and
(15).
Monotonicity of outputs obtains when 1 

1+
p
11
2p
12

1+
p
12
p
12
+

>  

1+
1
p
22

p
11
+2p
12
 
p
12
p
11
p
12
+

: Because   0, this property holds when 1 >

1+

p
11
p
12
  2
p
12
p
22

. Because   0, the
latter inequality also holds when 1 >
p
11
p
12
  2
p
12
p
22
or when  < p
12
(p
12
+ p
22
). However, for
a weak correlation, we have by denition  
p
2
12
p
11
(p
12
+ p
22
). But this latter left-hand-side
is lower than p
12
(p
12
+ p
22
) when p
12
 p
11
. Hence, monotonicity of outputs is ensured.
 Ex post rents are obtained from solving the system (10) to (13) (with  = 0). After
tedious computations, we nd:
u^
2
=  
p
11
p
22
2(p
12
+ )
(x^
c
  x
c
) < 0: (59)
u =
p
11
p
12
2(p
12
+ )
(x^
c
  x
c
) > 0: (60)
u^
1
  u x
c
= u  u^
2
=
p
11
2(p
11
+ p
12
)
(x^
c
  x
c
) > 0: (61)
u  u^
2
 x^
c
=  
p
12
2(p
11
+ p
12
)
(x^
c
  x
c
) < 0: (62)
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u^2
  u+x
c
= (x
c
  x^
c
) +
p
12
2(p
11
+ p
12
)
(x^
c
  x
c
) > 0: (63)
u  u^
1
+x^
c
=
p
11
+ 2p
12
2(p
11
+ p
12
)
(x^
c
  x
c
) > 0: (64)
 Using (63) and (64), it is immediate to show that a  agent's incentive constraint is
strictly satised. A

 agent receives a strictly positive rent in this truthful equilibrium:
U(

) =
1
p
11
+p
12
(p
11
u+p
12
u^
1
) = 

p
11
x^
c
+p
12
x
c
p
11
+p
12

 
p
11
p
12
+
(x^
c
 x
c
) which is strictly positive
since the factor of x is strictly positive and the factor of x^ is also strictly positive (p
12
+
   (p
11
+ p
12
) > 0 when  > 0 and p
11
+ p
12
< 1).
Lastly, monotonicity of the decision rule and the fact that (11) and (12) are binding
ensure that the other coalition incentive constraints are satised.
Asymmetric Grand-Mechanisms: One may wonder whether the principal could not
prevent collusion in a cheaper way by oering a grand-mechanism which treats dierently
both agents still keeping a symmetric decision rule. In particular, we would have some
exibility in setting 
1
6= 
2
and asymmetric transfers in all states of nature. For a weak
correlation, one can show that the same monotonicity conditions as under symmetric
information within the coalition can be derived, namely x  x^  x. Again, the costs of the
coalition incentive constraints involving a (;

) coalition are minimized when 
1
= 
2
= 0.
There is then a simple argument showing that, in fact, there is always a symmetric
mechanism which does at least as well for the principal. First note that the principal's
payo depends only on the sum of the agents' ex post rents. Suppose indeed that the
optimal weak collusion-proof grand-mechanism is then asymmetric. Let us denote by G

1
this mechanism. Because of symmetry, another mechanism G

2
obtained by permuting
all indices is also a solution. The grand-mechanism
1
2
G

1
+
1
2
G

2
obtained by averaging ex
post rents with an equal weight is symmetric. Moreover, it is also individually incentive
compatible for both agents and satisfy the same coalition incentive constraints as G

1
.
Hence, it achieves the same welfare as G

1
and G

2
. Finally, there is no loss of generality
in looking for optimal symmetric mechanisms in the case of a weak correlation.
Proof of Proposition 7: Monotonicity of outputs obtains when 1  

1+
p
11
2p
12

1 +
p
12
p
12
+

>  

1+
1
p
22

p
11
+ 2p
12
 
p
12
p
11
p
12
+

: This condition does not hold when p
12
is small
enough, i.e., for strong correlation. Pooling arises at the optimum. Solving for the solution
of the principal's problem under the cons]TJaint that x^ = x = x
P
yields the rs] order
condition: (2p
12
+p
22
)c
0
(x
P
) = 2p
22
+2p
12
(+

) 
1
1+
((p
12
+p
11
)++): Simplifying,
we get (16).
Proof of Proposition 8: The optimal con]TJact is obtained for a non-monotonic
schedule of outputs, x > x > x^. Then the principal nds optimal to choose  = 1 to
33
minimize the cost of (12).
28
The binding constraints of (P ) are then:
(BIC) p
11
u+ p
12
u^
1
 p
11
u^
2
+ p
12
u+(p
11
x^+ p
12
x) (65)
(CIC)
1
2u  2u+ 2x (66)
(CIC)
2
u^
1
+ u^
2
 2u +x+
p
11
p
12
(x^  x) (67)
where  = 1
(IR) p
12
u^
2
+ p
22
u  0: (68)
 Let denote by respectively , ,  and  the multipliers of these constraints. Proceeding
as in Proof of Proposition 5, we nd  =
2p
12
(p
11
+p
12
)(p
22
+p
12
)
,  =
p
11

p
12
+
,  =
2p
12

p
12
+
,
 =
2
p
12
+p
22
.
 Solving for the optimal outputs yields x
c
= x

and c
0
(x^
c
) = +

 

1+
p
11
p
12
+

1 +
1
p
12


when p
12
is small enough, the positiveness constraint x^
c
 0 is binding and x^
c
= 0 is in
fact optimal. Finally, we have also: c
0
(x
c
) = 2 

1+
2p
12
p
22
: Hence, x
c
converges towards
x

when p
12
becomes arbitrarily small.
 Solving for the values of the ex post rents, u = u^
2
= 0, u^
1
= x
c

1  
p
11
p
12

and
u = x
c
. It is routine to check that all neglected Bayesian incentive, participation and
collusion-proofness constraints are satised.
Proof of Proposition 9: To derive the equilibrium correspondence of G

when
posterior beliefs change, rst, note that for any belief system, a  agent (whether a deviant
or a non-deviant one) reports truthfully because of dominant strategy for this type. Hence,
non-truthful equilibria obtains when a

 agent A
2
(the non-deviant agent) lies and claims
he is . Since a

 agent A
2
is indierent between claiming  and

 when G

is played
with passive beliefs ((10) is binding for G

) and since (16) holds, a

 agent A
2
prefers to
claim  when G

is played with optimistic beliefs ~p
1
> p. Then, since (17) and (22) hold,
A
1
whatever his type reports truthfully. It is thus immediate that E(G

; ~p
1
; p) = fe

2
g for
optimistic beliefs ~p
1
> p. For pessimistic beliefs, a

 agent A
2
always prefers to report
instead his true type

. Non-truthful equilibria where A
2
lies cannot hold. However, the
deviant agent A
1
still having passive beliefs on A
2
and being indierent between lying or
not (since (10) is binding in G

) may also lie without changing A
2
's incentives to tell the
truth. Thus, we have E(G

; ~p
1
; p) = fe

; e

1
g for pessimistic beliefs.
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 belongs to the open interval [0; 1[ but can be made as close as possible to one by increasing the
multiplier  of the incentive constraint in the third party's problem.
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